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Abstract 
Two years after the deregulation of the German interurban bus industry in January 2013, two 
new entrants emerged as market leaders: MeinFernbus (MFB) and FlixBus (FB). We use a 
comprehensive route-level data set to investigate the determinants of route entry for both 
providers. Applying survival models, we find that both companies show an increased 
probability to enter populous, centrally located routes with large shares of young inhabitants; 
however, they both avoid entries into routes including an airport or with low quality rail 
connection. Furthermore, both market leaders refrain from entering small and medium-sized 
routes in which another provider is already operating. In large markets, however, they both 
show an increased entry probability independent of the presence of a competitor.   
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1 Introduction  
The importance of market entry for competition and innovation is mainly twofold. On the one 
hand, entry plays a crucial role as an equilibrium force in that it competes away excess profits 
to an equilibrium level. Such imitative entry occurs when the entrant can reap profits by 
copying the established firms product or method of production. On the other hand, entry also 
plays a creative role in markets, serving as a vehicle for the introduction and diffusion of 
innovations. Such innovative entry occurs when the entrant either finds new ways to saturate a 
certain customer’s need or is able to produce a given product with less input. Innovative entry 
is seen as a disequilibrium force that propels the industry from one equilibrium state to 
another (see, e.g., Geroski, 1991, 1995, and Hüschelrath and Müller, 2013). 
 Although both imitative and innovative entry are common occurrences in many industries 
and markets, recently deregulated industries provide a particularly appealing environment to 
study both types of entry – first and foremost because the removal of legal barriers to entry is 
expected to be followed by the development of new business concepts and their application in 
both existing (incumbent) markets (i.e., imitative entry) and new markets (i.e., innovative 
entry). Although the study of the effects of such market entries on, e.g., price levels and 
consumer welfare is particularly appealing – reflected in many ex-post studies guided by the 
seminal contributions of Morrison and Winston (1986) and Kahn (1988, 2003) – the 
complementary question after the determinants of entry is at least equally important in 
understanding competitive processes in deregulated industries.   
 In this context, we take the opportunity of the recently deregulated German interurban bus 
industry to investigate the following two separate but related research questions: First, what 
are key determinants of route entry in the deregulated interurban bus industry? Answers to 
this question are not only helpful in understanding the evolution of competition in the industry 
but are also of value in developing well-founded scenarios for the future development of 
competitive interaction in the industry. Second, given their (eventually) clear role as market 
leaders, the question whether and how the entry strategies of MeinFernbus (MFB) and 
FlixBus (FB) differ suggest itself. In this respect, it is especially interesting to investigate 
whether the two providers actively promoted competition by entering each other’s routes (i.e., 
imitative entry) or whether they preferred to avoid direct confrontation wherever possible 
(i.e., innovative entry).  
 Aiming at providing answers to these two main research questions, we use a 
comprehensive route-level data set to investigate the determinants of route entry in the first 
two years of the deregulated industry. Applying survival models, we find that both companies 
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show an increased probability to enter populous, centrally located routes with large shares of 
young inhabitants; however, they both avoid entries into routes including an airport or with 
low quality rail connection. Furthermore, both market leaders refrain from entering small and 
medium-sized routes in which another provider is already operating. In large markets, 
however, they both show an increased entry probability independent of the presence of a 
competitor. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we provide an 
initial characterization of the German interurban bus industry, subdivided further into a 
description of the deregulation movement, a high-level perspective on general post-
deregulation entry activities as well as the resulting degree of competitive interaction. In the 
third section, we present our empirical analysis of the determinants of route entry. Based on 
an initial discussion of general determinants of entry into interurban bus markets, we 
subsequently develop our empirical strategy and provide a description of our data set. 
Following a detailed characterization of our main estimation results and a discussion of 
important implications for business strategy and public policy, the final fourth section 
concludes the paper with a review of its main insights and the derivation of several avenues 
for future research. 
2 The German Interurban Bus Industry 
In this section, we provide an initial characterization of the German interurban bus industry. 
Following a description of the deregulation movement in Section 2.1, we present a high-level 
perspective on general post-deregulation entry activities in Section 2.2 and the resulting 
degree of competitive interaction in Section 2.3. 
2.1 Deregulation  
Although the majority of deregulation movements in many network industries and countries 
were initiated and implemented two to three decades ago, a mixture of public policy 
arguments and lobbying activities delayed the necessary steps towards deregulation in the 
case of the German interurban bus industry. Since 1931, bus companies were only allowed to 
offer regular interurban bus services on routes on which the state-owned German railway 
company Deutsche Bahn AG (or its predecessors) was unable to provide an acceptable 
service. Due to the rather dense (intercity) railway network in Germany, the respective law – 
that aimed at protecting a core business of Deutsche Bahn AG – led to only sporadic 
interurban bus services except for routes to/from former West Berlin (operated by Berlin 
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Linien Bus), routes to/from airports with no rail connection1 and international routes (by 
providers such as Eurolines Germany).  
 In parallel to initiatives by the European Commission to liberalize the international 
carriage of passengers by coach and bus2, in 2009, the German government announced plans 
to liberalize the national German interurban bus industry. Despite several attempts by 
different lobbying groups to prevent or at least weaken any policy action, the German 
interurban bus industry was deregulated in January 2013 – after the respective paragraphs of 
the Passenger Transport Act3 were changed in the usual legislative (and lobbying) processes 
(see generally Maertens (2012) and Schiefelbusch (2013) for further information). According 
to the new paragraph 42a Personenbeförderungsgesetz (‘Passenger Transportation Act’) 
national scheduled transport with passenger vehicles is allowed for routes above a distance of 
50 kilometers and where no regional rail connection with up to one hour travel time is offered.   
2.2 Deregulation and entry 
Prior experiences with deregulation processes in transport industries in general4 and 
interurban bus industries in particular5 raise the expectation that – at the early stages of a 
deregulated industry – substantial market entry by both new and incumbent firms will lead to 
both the creation of new lines and routes6 and an increase in the number of competitors on 
existing lines and routes.  
 The German interurban bus industry meets these expectations. Following full liberalization 
in January 2013, many (potential) providers decided to apply for an operating license. 
According to the Office for Goods Transport (2014, p. 15), the number of licenses increased 
from 86 in December 2012 to 158 in June 2013 and finally 301 in September 2014 (an overall 
increase of 350 per cent). The increase in licenses is also reflected in an increase in both 
                                                     
1  In the majority of cases, such routes were connecting inner cities with secondary airports often located in 
rural areas such as, for example, Mannheim to Frankfurt Hahn airport (HHN), a road trip of more than 130 
kilometers (that cannot be undertaken by rail).   
2  Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on 
common rules for access to the international market for coach and bus services, and amending Regulation 
(EC) No  561/2006, Official Journal of the European Union L 300/88-105. During the legislative process, the 
European Commission commissioned a study on passenger transport by coach in the European Union (see 
Steer Davies Gleave (2009)). 
3  The most important change – leading to the liberalization of the interurban bus industry – referred to §13(2) 
Personenbeförderungsgesetz (‘Passenger Transport Act’) in which the strict entry regulations were codified. 
4  See, e.g., Williams (1993), Morrison and Winston (1986, 1995) or Borenstein and Rose (2007) for the US 
airline industry. 
5  See, e.g., Robbins and White (1986, 2012) for Great Britain or Aarhaug et al. (2012) for Norway. 
6  In the remainder of this article, a line is defined as an offered regular (scheduled) service from a particular 
departure city to a particular arrival city, for example, from Hamburg to Munich. A line usually contains 
several stops, that is, passengers are able to board the bus at a later city and/or get off the bus at an earlier city 
than the final destination. We therefore define each combination between two different stops on a line as 
route, that is, if a line has ܰ stops, the number of routes is ∑ ݅ேିଵ௜ୀଵ . The route is our unit of observation and 
analysis in both the descriptive and the econometric approaches.  
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available lines and daily frequency of service on these lines. Comparing a week in August 
2013 with the same week in August 2014 reveals that the number of lines increased from 113 
to 244 (an increase of about 116 per cent) while the number of trips jumped from 2,360 to 
7,088 (an increase of about 300 per cent; see Office for Goods Transport (2014), p. 17). 
 In terms of served routes, the availability of an exhaustive data set of all route entry 
decisions in the first two years after deregulation – provided by Simplex Mobility and 
characterized in more detail in Section 3.3 below – allows a much more detailed qualitative 
assessment of route-level entry activity in the industry. In this respect, Figure 1 shows the 
number of served routes in the German interurban bus industry on the monthly level from 
January 2013 to December 2014.  
 
Figure 1: Number of served routes in the German interurban bus industry 
Source: own figure based on Simplex Mobility schedule data 
As revealed by Figure 1, the industry experienced an impressive general growth in the number 
of served routes. Beginning from 151 routes in January 2013, the aggregated entry activity of 
all providers led to an overall network consisting of 3,603 routes in December 2014 (an 
increase of a magnitude of 24). Furthermore, Figure 1 suggests a certain seasonality in entry 
(and exit) activity with a higher number of route entries in the spring and the summer and a 
lower (or even negative) increase in the number of served routes in the late fall and winter 
months. This is particularly obvious in the second year after deregulation were a larger 
number of (partly permanent, partly only temporary) route exits by BerlinLinienBus (and a 
few smaller operators including particularly DeutscheTouring) led to a clear decrease in the 
number of served routes. 
 Turning from an analysis of aggregated entry activity of all providers to a more detailed 
analysis of single providers, the industry can generally be separated into one incumbent 
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(BerlinLinienBus), three (eventually larger) new entrants (MeinFernbus, FlixBus and ADAC 
Postbus) who constructed nation-wide networks in the first two years after deregulation, 
regionals (providing specific regional services such as, e.g., transfers to secondary airports) 
and others who are mostly operating a small selection of lines connecting urban areas (such 
as, e.g., DeinBus). As shown in Figure 1, the first year after deregulation experienced a 
substantial growth in the entry activities of particularly BerlinLinienBus and MeinFernbus. 
While the former company had substantial prior experiences in operating bus services from 
the regulatory era, also MeinFernbus started operating (on a small scale though) still in the 
regulatory era in April 2012. FlixBus and ADAC Postbus, however, commenced their 
operations in February 2013 and October 2013, respectively, providing a straightforward 
explanation for their smaller numbers of served routes in the first year of our observation 
period.  
 For 2014 – the second year after deregulation – Figure 1 above reveals a further substantial 
increase in the number of served routes, particularly driven by elevated entry activities of 
FlixBus and ADAC Postbus but also fortified by further expansions of BerlinLinienBus and 
MeinFernbus. Eventually, in December 2014, MeinFernbus was the market leader providing 
services on 1,296 routes (i.e., a share of 36 percent), followed by FlixBus which was present 
on 947 routes (i.e., a share of 26 percent) and BerlinLinienBus and ADAC Postbus with 603 
and 369 routes (i.e., 17 percent and 10 percent), respectively.7  
 Despite the clear growth trend in the German interurban bus industry in the first two years 
after deregulation, its absolute size – in terms of passengers carried – must still be considered 
as rather small. For example, according to data from the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany, the number of passengers travelled by regular interurban buses increased from 8.2 
million in 2013 to about 20 million passengers in 2015. Although these numbers are still 
moderate compared to the about 131 million passengers which travelled on long-distance 
railway routes in 20158, the initial expectation of about 25 million passengers in the German 
interurban bus industry until the year 2030 – communicated as part of the most recent traffic 
forecast conducted by a consortium that was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry 
of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (2014) – is likely to be realized in 2016 already.  
                                                     
7  Generally, it is important to remark that the rather quick extension of the respective route networks of 
particularly the new entrants was possible through the introduction of a subcontractor-type business model in 
which already existing local bus companies – typically operating in the non-scheduled segment of the market 
for bus services before – agree to offer services under the respective (regional or national) interurban bus 
brand. 
8  See https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02/PD16_052_461.html (last 
accessed on 5 July 2016). 
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2.3 Deregulation, entry and competitive interaction 
Although the prior analysis of post-deregulation entry activities provides first important 
insights into industry developments, the study of competition in general and competitive 
interaction in particular demands a more detailed assessment of especially the relation 
between monopoly and competitive routes on the one hand and the degree of overlap of the 
respective providers’ route networks on the other.  
 Building on our initial analysis of the number of routes per provider in the previous section 
and under the strong assumption that the German interurban bus industry constitutes an own 
relevant market9, Figure 2 below plots the number of monopoly and competitive routes 
between January 2013 and December 2014.   
 
Figure 2: Number of served monopoly and competitive routes  
Source: own figure based on Simplex Mobility schedule data 
As shown in Figure 2, the number of monopoly routes follows a clear growth trend – with 
only one small temporary downward trend in winter 2013 – leading to in sum 1,259 served 
monopoly routes in December 2014. Interestingly, although the number of competitive routes 
is substantially larger than the number of monopoly routes in the large majority of months in 
our observation period, its development over time is more volatile leading to in sum 1,457 
served competitive routes in December 2014.    
                                                     
9  From an antitrust perspective, it is an ex ante open question whether the German interurban bus market 
constitutes an own relevant market or must be considered as a (rather small) fraction of a much larger 
transportation market (possibly including car sharing agencies, railway services etc.). While the narrow 
delineation of the relevant market would (by construction) lead to high market shares and therefore 
competition concerns, the latter broader delineation is likely to result in the conclusion that anticompetitive 
effects are unlikely to exist. In this respect, it should also be taken into account that the demand for 
interurban bus travel must be considered as highly elastic and market entry barriers as rather low (thereby 
reducing the possibilities to abuse market power through the implementation of permanent price increases).  
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 Although not shown in Figure 2, the competitive routes category can be subdivided further 
by the number of providers per route. For example, in December 2014, the majority of 1.080 
competitive routes (about 40 percent) were operated by two providers, compared to 164 
routes (about 6 percent) by three providers, 140 routes (about 5 percent) by four providers and 
73 routes (about 2 percent) were served by five or six providers.  
 Although both the existence and the number of competitors at the route-level are likely to 
be important determinants of market competition, research in industrial economics also 
suggests that the degree of competitive interaction can have an important effect on market 
conduct and market performance. For example, providers that meet on many routes may 
behave differently than providers who interact on a couple of routes only. In order to allow a 
more detailed study of these relationships for the German interurban bus industry, Table 1 
shows a matrix of monopoly routes and competitive route overlaps in December 2014.  
Table 1: Matrix of monopoly routes and competitive route overlaps (December 2014) 
 
Mein  
Fernbus FlixBus 
ADAC  
Postbus 
Berlin  
LinienBus Others Regionals 
Mein Fernbus 806 411 148 72 126 14 
FlixBus 411 446 159 69 138 6 
ADAC Postbus 148 159 177 14 75 5 
BerlinLinienBus 72 69 14 498 19 5 
Others 126 138 75 19 79 3 
Regionals 14 6 5 5 3 118 
   Note: Number of monopoly routes displayed in shaded cells; number of competitive routes displayed in remaining cells 
Starting off with a discussion of monopoly routes, Table 1 shows that, in December 2014, 
MeinFernbus was the leader with 806 routes, followed by BerlinLinienBus with 498 routes 
and FlixBus with 446 routes. ADAC Postbus is ranked fourth with in sum 177 monopoly 
routes. With respect to pair-wise overlaps on competitive routes – shown in the white cells in 
Table 1 – MeinFernbus and FlixBus met most often (on in sum 411 routes), followed by 
FlixBus and ADAC Postbus (159 routes) and MeinFernbus and ADAC Postbus (148 routes). 
Ceteris paribus, these findings suggest that competition between MeinFernbus and FlixBus is 
the by far fiercest. Furthermore, the level of direct competition with the third largest new 
entrant – ADAC Postbus – appears similar for both market leaders while the only incumbent – 
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BerlinLinienBus – is only met (by both market leaders) on a comparably small number of 
about 70 routes.10   
 Complementary to studying the degree of pair-wise overlap for all major providers at one 
discrete point in time, Figure 3 below provides additional evidence for the two market leaders, 
MeinFernbus and FlixBus, by plotting both the respective monthly entry activities and the 
resulting route overlap for both providers.   
 
Figure 3: Number of served routes by MeinFernbus and FlixBus and route overlap 
Source: own figure based on Simplex Mobility schedule data 
As shown in Figure 3, the route overlap between MeinFernbus and FlixBus increased with a 
roughly constant rate over the entire observation period reaching 411 route overlaps (i.e., 
about 23 percent of all routes) in December 2014. While there was hardly any overlap in the 
first few months after liberalization, growth aspirations of both companies made an increasing 
overlap unavoidable – particularly in medium and large markets. Ceteris paribus, it is 
therefore reasonable to assume that competition between both companies became fiercer over 
time. 
 Additionally, Figure 3 shows the different entry activities of the two major players. While 
MeinFernbus substantially extended the number of the routes in spring and summer in the 
years 2013 and 2014, FlixBus applied more of a sustainable growth strategy in the sense that 
it constantly added new routes (even in the fall and winter months). Although still being 
number two in terms of number of routes operated in December 2014, FlixBus successfully 
                                                     
10  Comparing the number of route overlaps in December 2014 with February 2014 reveals an increase by the 
factor 3.8 with respect to MFB/FB, compared to 2.6 for MFB/ADAC, 1.9 for MFB/BLB, 1.9 for FB/ADAC, 
1.4 for FB/BLB and -2.8 for BLB/ADAC.  
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managed to close the gap to MeinFernbus significantly in the ‘number of routes served’ 
category compared to the situation in 2013. 
 Due to the importance of both market leaders – MeinFernbus and FlixBus – for 
competition in the German interurban bus industry, our subsequent empirical analysis of the 
determinants of entry explicitly focuses on these two companies. In addition to an 
investigation of the main determinants of entry – and the potential identification of differences 
in the respective entry strategies – we also aim at increasing our knowledge on competitive 
interaction in the recently deregulated German interurban bus industry. Such an analysis gains 
further importance with the additional information that, in January 2015, MeinFernbus and 
FlixBus announced their plan to merge. Although an analysis of the merger and its 
consequences on competition in the industry is beyond the scope of this paper (see Dürr et al. 
(2016) for further information and analysis), our assessment of the entry strategies of the 
merging parties will also allow drawing several conclusions on the (anti-) competitiveness of 
the announced merger plans.  
3 Empirical analysis  
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis of the entry behavior of the two industry 
leaders MeinFernbus and FlixBus. While Section 3.1 discusses important determinants of 
entry into transport markets in general and interurban bus markets in particular, Section 3.2 
develops our empirical strategy. Following a description of our data set in Section 3.3 and the 
presentation of our main estimation results in the Section 3.4, the final Section 3.5 provides a 
discussion of important implications for business strategy and public policy.  
3.1 General determinants of entry   
Any meaningful empirical analysis of the determinants of entry in transport markets in 
general and interurban bus markets in particular must be guided by both theory- and facts-
based knowledge on possible key factors that may affect entry decisions. Generally, a 
transport network is constructed by multiple market entry decisions. In determining these 
decisions, a company’s management generally has to assess both the external attractiveness of 
the candidate markets – determined by potential customers, suppliers, competitors and 
partners – and the internal capabilities and resources of the company that determine its ability 
to compete in the respective candidate markets (see, e.g., Spulber (2009), pp. 433ff.).  
 Limiting our further assessment to the external attractiveness of candidate markets, prior 
research particularly on the determinants of entry in airline markets (see, e.g., Müller et al. 
(2012) for an overview) suggests to condense down market entry decisions to answers of the 
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following two questions: 'Is entry profitable?' and 'Is entry possible?'. With respect to the 
profitability question, it can be expected that current and expected profitability of a particular 
market typically is a key determinant in the decision to enter a market. In general, it is 
reasonable to assume that a profit-maximizing, risk-neutral firm will enter a market if the net 
present value of expected post-entry profits is greater than the sunk costs of entry. As post-
entry profits depend on post-entry competition, the entry decision therefore is connected to 
the entrant's expectations about the conduct and performance of the firms after entry. 
Furthermore, the level of sunk costs incurred is a critical determinant of the entry decision 
(see, e.g., Besanko et al. (1996), pp. 396 ff.). The higher the necessary sunk costs to enter an 
industry, the higher is the risk of entry and the lower the expected profits. Additionally, the 
entry condition above clarifies that profits immediately after entry are not necessary for a 
rational entry decision. It is sufficient that, for instance, market growth expectations promise 
ample profits in the future. Furthermore, with respect to entry sequence, routes which are 
expected to be most profitable should be entered first. 
 Although the expected profitability certainly is a key determinant of entry, empirical 
studies have regularly found evidence that abnormal profits are not competed away by entry 
but remain persistent for longer time periods (see Geroski (1995) for a general analysis). This 
finding suggests that an entrant also has to address the issue of the possible extent of entry 
into a particular market and implies that a positive net present value (which at least outweighs 
sunk costs) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for entry – as barriers to entry can 
reduce or even eliminate entry incentives. In transport markets, prominent (structural and/or 
strategic) barriers to entry are access to necessary (point and line) infrastructures, brand 
loyalty programs, or network size in combination with service frequency.  
 Applying the general separation of entry possibility and entry profitability to the (German) 
interurban bus industry, there are currently no reasons to believe that specific barriers 
substantially constrain the entry of providers (in their entirety or with respect to certain 
routes). With respect to the entry to the industry as such, the existing obligations of any new 
interurban bus company to apply for an operating license is unlikely to be a significant entry 
barrier (as also reflected in the rise in new licenses issued after deregulation described in 
Section 2.2 above).  
 Furthermore, although smaller bus companies as subcontracting partner – exclusively used 
by virtually all new entrants to the industry to allow a quicker and more efficient extension of 
their route networks – are a strategic resource for a sustainable market entry into the industry 
in general and significant route extension in particular, there are currently no signs that a large 
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fraction of existing smaller bus companies (together with the compulsory driving personnel) 
are already contracted by an existing provider and are thus constraining the entry possibilities 
of new competitors. Additionally, buses as such are – by construction – a highly mobile factor 
of production thus allowing a very flexible operation over the entire country.   
 With respect to entry into particular route markets, there have been instances reported in 
particular cities that the respective main bus stations reached capacity limits during certain 
times of the day (and the respective providers were forced to use secondary bus stations in the 
suburbs of the respective cities). However, currently, these instances appear to be exceptions 
rather than the rule. Furthermore, although brand recognition is likely to become an entry 
barrier in the future – as particularly the market leaders substantially invest in marketing 
campaigns – it currently is unlikely to impose a substantial entry barrier (particularly as the 
respective search platforms on the internet list all providers for a specific route on the specific 
day). This reasoning is fortified by the large absence of frequent travellers programs in the 
industry (that typically aim at increasing switching costs for travellers). Last but not least, 
although network size and frequency of service is an important advantage of larger providers, 
the current absence of a hub-and-spoke concept in the industry reduces the size of the entry 
barrier created by both characteristics.   
 Due to the (current) absence of severe entry barriers, it is reasonable to assume that the 
entry decisions of interurban bus companies are mainly guided by the profits expected to be 
earned. In thinking further about how meaningful profit drivers look like, we introduce a 
differentiation into (1) the presence and characteristics of competitors, (2) spatial structure, 
(3) demographics, and (4) mode characteristics.   
With respect to the presence and characteristics of competitors, we expect that the probability 
of route entry is influenced by the following two variables:  
 The general presence of competitors. Ceteris paribus, other firms in the market reduce 
profit expectations due to competition (thus suggesting a negative relationship with 
entry activity). However, as medium and large markets typically allow more than one 
provider to make a positive profit – and generally offer substantially larger revenue 
potentials – the presence of competitors is expected to have either no or a substantially 
alleviated negative effect on the probability to enter such larger markets.    
 The different types of competitors. Although it is reasonable to assume that both cost 
and quality levels do not differ greatly between interurban bus providers, the existing 
competitors still differ with respect to both overall size (strength) and degree of 
competitive interaction. We therefore expect that the probability of entry of a certain 
12 
provider differs between different types of competitors already operating on the 
respective route. Ceteris paribus, closer competitors (who meet frequently in a larger 
number of routes) are expected to be avoided in small markets, however, attacked in 
larger markets – as they generally contain the possibility of positive profits for more 
than one provider and are also likely to be important ‘backbones’ in the construction 
of a national interurban bus network.  
With respect to spatial structure characteristics, we expect that the probability of route entry 
depends on the characteristics of the following three variables: 
 The geographical development of the route (within Germany), as more centrally 
located origin or destination cities can be served at lower costs and are more likely to 
pass larger urban areas in Germany. 
 The distances to the next motorway (of the respective origin and destination cities), as 
the closeness to motorways determines the costs of serving the respective cities from 
the perspectives of both the provider (through an increased fuel use) and its (transit) 
customers already on the bus (through increased opportunity costs of time incurred by 
the trip). 
 The length of the route (distance), as the competitive advantage of bus travel is 
particularly well developed in the short- and medium distance (as long distance travel 
increases the trip duration of the bus substantially (compared to the train) due to the 
frequent stops and an increased likelihood of delays through unexpected traffic jams). 
Turning to demographic characteristics that might affect entry profitability and therefore 
entry probability, we consider the following four variables as important drivers:  
 The market size, as, ceteris paribus, a higher absolute population makes it more likely 
that a sufficiently large share of potential bus customers exists. 
 The share of the population under 24 years of age, as particularly this fraction of the 
population is expected to have an increased likelihood to consider the bus as mode of 
transportation (due to both, an existing demand for medium- and long-haul travel and 
a typically constrained monthly travel budget).  
 The share of the population with higher education, as, on the one hand, an increasing 
share reduces the likelihood that a sufficiently large share of potential bus customers 
exist (e.g., due to the availability of a car or a preference to travel by train). However, 
on the other hand, students at or above the age of 24 years – together with 
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environmental-friendly professionals without an own car – may create a 
countervailing effect (generating a sufficient demand for interurban bus travel).   
 The share of tourism-related travel, as a significant fraction of holiday locations in the 
North (sea) and the South (mountains) of Germany are not well connected to the 
railway network and the bus therefore is the only public transportation mode available.       
Last but not least, we expect that the following two mode characteristics have an impact on 
the probability of entry: 
 The inclusion of an airport (as either origin or destination), as at least some airports 
are not well connected to the railway network and bus connections therefore have the 
potential to offer a competitive service on particularly short- and medium-haul routes. 
 The quality of existing railway connections – measured by the number of train changes 
needed to travel from the origin to the destination city – as it can be expected that the 
bus gains in attractiveness with a decreasing quality of railway travel. 
Based on this general discussion of possible key drivers of a decision to enter an interurban 
bus market, the following section will discuss the empirical strategy to investigate our 
research questions.  
3.2 Empirical strategy  
Based on the derivation of important general determinants of entry in the German interurban 
bus industry, we continue with the development of our empirical strategy. Although we 
provide – to the best of our knowledge – the first empirical assessment of the determinants of 
entry in the interurban bus industry, the development of a consistent empirical strategy can 
build on a rather rich related literature on entry in airline markets. From a methodological 
perspective, these contributions can broadly be sub-divided further into structural models and 
reduced form approaches (see Müller et al. (2012) for more detailed information).    
 The first group of papers focuses on the estimation of structural models of entry decisions 
and consists of contributions by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), Reiss and Spiller (1989), 
Berry (1992), Dunn (2008) or Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). The second group of papers – 
represented by studies such as Sinclair (1995), Boguslaski et al. (2004), Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008), Morrison and Winston (1990), Lederman and Januszewski (2003) or Müller 
et al. (2012) – follows reduced form approaches and estimate the likelihood of entry as a 
function of firm and market characteristics through an application of either probit or survival 
models.   
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 Comparing the general specificities of these two reduced form model types a little further, 
an important disadvantage of the probit model is its inability to take adequate account of the 
timing of entry decisions (possibly leading to unreliable results as soon as the problem of right 
censoring plays a significant role). As, by construction, survival models take this timing of 
entry decisions into account – a crucial aspect having in mind our own research questions – 
we predominantly apply survival models rather than probit models as part of our subsequent 
empirical analysis. While Section 3.2.1 discusses our baseline model of the general 
determinants of entry, Section 3.2.2 continues with the derivation of an extension of the 
baseline model (allowing further insights into the competitive interaction of particularly 
MeinFernbus and FlixBus, but also BerlinLinienBus and ADAC Postbus as the third and 
fourth largest providers).   
3.2.1 Baseline model: General determinants of entry   
Survival analysis – also referred to as ‘time to event’ analysis or more generally duration 
analysis – represent a common tool to analyze the time until the occurrence of an event and is 
frequently applied not only in economics but also in a variety of other disciplines such as 
pharmaceutical statistics (e.g., to assess the efficacy of a new therapy in a clinical trial) or 
engineering (e.g., to study the lifetime of machine components).  
 There are two main concepts in the field of survival analysis. The first is the survivor 
function which is used to determine the probability of an individual to survive beyond a 
certain point in time (i.e., a firm is still refraining from entering the market). The second 
concept is the hazard rate or hazard function which is the probability that an individual will 
experience the event while that individual is at risk for having an event (i.e., the probability 
that a firm will enter the market in t and was not serving it in t-1).  
 Survival analysis enables us to effectively consider right censoring. Right-censoring means 
that some individuals or routes do not experience the event until the end of the observation 
period (see Allison 2010, pp. 413ff.). In our case, routes are said to be right-censored if they 
have not been entered until the end of our observation period, however, potentially will 
experience entry afterwards. To adequately consider right-censoring the dependent variable in 
survival analysis has two components: 1) the time to event and 2) the event status, which 
records if the event of interest occurred during the observed time period or not. Generally, 
survival analysis can be either conducted non-parametrically, parametrically or semi-
parametrically (see Cox, 1972). As the Cox model imposes no restrictions on the shape of the 
baseline hazard, the baseline hazard can be as flexible as possible.  
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 Bringing survival analysis to our research question, we aim at identifying the determinants 
of entry in general and differences in entry behavior between the two market leaders (and 
main competitors) MFB and FB. For this purpose, we estimate both survival functions and 
hazard rates where each city pair is regarded as a subject that can ‘die’ within the observation 
period but can also ‘die’ afterwards. ‘Dying’ is this case means that a route ݎ is entered by a 
competitor ݅. Entry can happen only once as afterwards the respective route cannot be 
populated again and is therefore considered as ‘dead’ for competitor ݅. However, competitor ݆ 
might still enter the route. Technically speaking, the concept of survival models takes into 
account the right censoring of the data, i.e., a route can still ‘die’ after our observation period 
of two years. In fact, this appears to be a reasonable assumption as we in fact observe 
additional entry activity in the year 2015 as well.  
 The ultimate goal of survival models is to determine and compare survival functions and 
hazard functions of two disjunct groups of subjects. In our case, these two groups are sub-
markets that have been populated by MFB versus sub-markets that have been populated by 
FB. In our baseline specification, we therefore estimate a survival function of provider ݅ in 
month ݐ with the following form: 
݄௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻ ∙ ݁ݔ݌ሺߚଵ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௢௧௛௘௥ ௧ ∗ ݈௠௔௥௞௘௧ ൅ ߚଶ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ ௢௧௛௘௥ ௧ ∗ ݉௠௔௥௞௘௧
൅ ߚଷ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௢௧௛௘௥	௧ ∗ ݏ௠௔௥௞௘௧ ൅෍ ߛ௡ܺ௡௥
ே
௜ୀଵ
ሻ (1)
 where the term ݄଴ሺݐሻ can be seen as a representation of the intercept as it can be found in 
linear or logistic regression models. Accordingly, ݄଴ሺݐሻ gives the hazard – in our case the 
entry into a market – in t in case all other control variables are equal to zero.  Furthermore, 
guided by our expectations discussed in Section 3.1, namely that the survival probability of a 
market is expected to be related to the size (and therefore attractiveness in terms of revenue 
potential) of the market, we split the presence of any provider into three subgroups: large, 
medium, and small markets (as measured by the sum of inhabitants in both origin and 
destination cities). ∑ ߛ௡ܺ௡௥ே௜ୀଵ  includes the control variables discussed in the previous section 
and specified further in Section 3.3 below. 
3.2.2 Model extension: Differentiating between different types of competitors 
In addition to our baseline model, we implement a model extension in which we enlarge our 
perspective on the determinants of entry by splitting up the highly aggregated presentother 
variable into the more meaningful variables FB or MFB, respectively, as well as 
BerlinLinienBus and ADAC Postbus (as the third and fourth largest competitors on the 
national level). Technically, in Equation (1), we replace ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௢௧௛௘௥	௧		with ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௝௧, 
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where ݆ represents the respective other provider. The model specification accordingly changes 
to the following form: 
݄௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻ ∙ ݁ݔ݌ሺߛଵ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ ௝௧ ∗ ݈_݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ൅ ߛଶ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௝௧ ∗ ݉_݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ
൅ ߛଷ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௝௧ ∗ ݏ_݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ൅ ߛସ݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐ௢௧௛௘௥௦ ௧ ൅෍ ߛ௡ܺ௡௥
ே
௜ୀଵ
ሻ (2)
As one control variable, we still include whether any of the remaining 26 competitors is 
present already (regardless of market size). In the next section, we will provide a detailed 
description auf our data set in general and the construction of our main dependent and 
independent variables in particular.   
3.3 Data set and descriptive statistics 
Our main data set was provided by Simplex Mobility and consists of all route11 entries of all 
interurban bus providers from the beginning of the deregulation era in January 2013 to the end 
of the second year of deregulation in December 2014. In sum, the raw data set consists of 
3,402 routes. We added to this route-level data all additional routes that were entered in the 
third year of the deregulation era in order to identify a population of routes with a significant 
probability of entry but which were, for profitability or other reasons, not entered in the first 
two years after deregulation. Our final data set therefore consists of in sum 4,159 city pairs 
that either have been served within the first two years after deregulation or were populated in 
the subsequent year 2015.  
 We define these routes between cities as submarkets which have been gradually entered by 
28 different providers – the incumbent BerlinLinienBus, the (eventually) two market leaders 
MeinFernbus (MFB) and FlixBus (FB), ADAC Postbus as further larger new entrant with a 
national route presence as well as 13 other providers12 and 11 regional providers13 – resulting 
in a balanced panel data set for the first 24 months of the industry with a total of 99,816 
observations. Furthermore, we have collected additional data – obtained from the Federal 
                                                     
11  Generally, three different levels of analysis can be differentiated: the line, the route and the trip. A line is 
defined as an offered regular (scheduled) service from a particular origin (departure) city to a particular 
destination (arrival) city, for example, from Hamburg to Munich. A line usually contains several stops, that 
is, passengers are able to board the bus at a later city and/or get off the bus at an earlier city than the final 
destination. Each combination between two different stops on a line is defined as a route, that is, if a line has 
N stops, the number of routes is ∑ ݅ேିଵ௜ୀଵ . The (non-directional) route is our unit of observation and analysis.  
12  The group of ‘others’ mostly provides services on a small selection of lines connecting urban areas (as well 
as international services) and consists of City2City, DBFernbus, DeinBus, DeLuxExpress, DeutscheTouring, 
FassReisen, MatzesMiniBus, Megabus, PublicExpress, SchnurstracksBus, Seelandexpress, SprintBus and 
UniversReisen. 
13  The group of ‘regionals’ mostly provides specific regional services (e.g., transfers to secondary airports) and 
consists of AllgaeuAirportExpress, Autobus Oberbayern, CuxBus Express, Innliner, Muenchenlinie, 
Omnibus Wunder, Ostfriesland Express, Regionalverkehr Erzgebirge, Trier Koeln Express, Usedomer 
Baederbahn and Vogtland Express.  
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Statistical Office of Germany and the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning – to 
be able to construct the respective spatial structure, demographic and mode characteristics 
variables. Last but not least, road distances between the respective origin and destination city 
centers were retrieved from Google Maps. Table 2 below present the descriptive statistics 
together with a brief description of the construction of our main variables.   
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Competitor presence variables 
Present MFB = 1 if MeinFernbus already served the 
route upon entry 
0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Present FB = 1 if FlixBus already served the route 
upon entry 
0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Present others =1 if at least one competitor other than 
MFB or FB served the route upon entry 
0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Spatial structure variables 
Centrality in 
Germany 
Maximum linear distance (in km) to the 
center of Germany for either origin or  
destination city 
-280.38 90.51 -438.14 -39.82 
Max. motor-
way distance 
Maximum distance to next motorway of 
origin or destination city (in minutes) 
14.52 210.72 1 70 
Distance Road distance (in km) between origin and 
destination city centers 
278.03 182.56 50.20 1080.00 
Demographic variables 
Market size (ln) Logarithm of the sum of city populations 
in origin and destination cities 
5.45 1.85 -0.66 8.53 
Max. share 
under 24 
Maximum share of population under 24 
years in either origin or destination city 
24.95 1.68 18.70 28.90 
Max. higher 
education 
Maximum share of population with A 
levels in either origin or destination city 
39.62 9.92 13.20 65.20 
Max. tourism  Maximum value of overnight stays per 
inhabitant at either orig. or dest. city 
3.24 1.08 1.60 6.20 
Mode characteristics variables 
Airport shuttle =1 if the origin and/or destination city is 
an airport 
0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Changes (train) Number of train changes needed to travel 
from origin to destination city by rail 
1.98 1.23 0.00 7.33 
Without aiming at providing a detailed discussion of Table 2, it is important to briefly point to 
the descriptive statistics of our main variables. For example, as revealed by the Present MFB, 
Present FB and Present others variables, in 17 percent of all route entries, MFB was already 
operating on the respective route (compared to 9 percent for FB and 26 percent for other 
providers). Consequently, 52 percent of all entries took place in existing markets while the 
remaining 48 percent of all entries created new markets (by being the first provider operating 
on the respective route). The corresponding absolute numbers of entries into existing and new 
markets in the first two years after deregulation are provided in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Matrix of entries into existing and new markets (in 2013 and 2014) 
 
Mein  
Fernbus FlixBus 
ADAC  
Postbus 
Berlin  
Linien 
Bus 
Others Regionals 
Total 
entries 
MeinFernbus 1,178 189 59 147 105 17 1,526 
FlixBus 277 641 74 149 130 22 1,110 
ADAC Postbus 143 136 287 78 97 3 532 
BerlinLinienBus 48 56 9 1,231 68 27 1,384 
Others 90 112 30 74 629 5 825 
Regionals 1 2 2 7 4 262 273 
   Note: Number of entries into new markets in shaded cells; number of entries in existing markets in remaining cells 
As revealed by the respective shaded cells in Table 3, BerlinLinienBus had most entries into 
new markets (1,231 route entries), however, closely followed by MeinFernbus showing 1,178 
‘innovative’ entries. All other providers show substantially smaller entry activities into such 
markets. With respect to entry into existing markets, i.e., imitative entry, FlixBus entries into 
markets in which MeinFernbus was already present appeared most often (277 entries), 
followed by 189 entries of MeinFernbus into FlixBus markets and 149 entries by FlixBus into 
BerlinLinienBus markets. Finally, referring to the ‘total entries’ column in Table 3, it is 
important to remark that the number of total entries per provider is not the sum of the 
preceding columns as a provider may enter markets that were populated by two or more 
competitors already.  
 Turning to the spatial structure variables, as reflected in the values of the Centrality in 
Germany variable, the origin and destination cities of our routes show an average linear 
distance to the central point in Germany of 280 kilometers.14 The average distance to the next 
motorway (Motorway distance) is about 14 minutes and the average distance of an interurban 
bus trip (Distance) is 278 kilometers (however, with a rather large spectrum from 50.2 
kilometers to 1080.0 kilometers).  
 The Market size variable – defined as the sum of the inhabitants at the origin and 
destination city – shows a mean ln value of 5.45 (corresponding to an absolute average market 
size of about 232 thousand inhabitants).15 The average maximum share of population under 
24 years (Max. share under 24) is about 25 percent, compared to an average maximum share 
of population with A levels (Max. higher education) of about 40 percent. Furthermore, the 
                                                     
14  Please note that we have constructed different measures of centrality such as, e.g., a measure indicating the 
average additional time if one would take a detour via the respective city as well as various regional 
centrality measures. However, as it turned out that these more sophisticated measures had no major impact on 
our estimation results, we decided to follow the rather simple approach described above.  
15  The maximum value of 8.53 corresponds to a market size of 5 million, which is the market between the two 
largest cities in Germany: Berlin and Hamburg. 
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maximum value of overnight stays per inhabitant (Max. tourism) is found to be slightly higher 
than 3 overnight stays. 
 Finally yet importantly, Table 2 shows that about 7 percent of all routes include an airport 
(Airport Shuttle) as either origin or destination of the route. On average, almost two train 
changes are necessary to travel from the origin to the destination by rail (Change (train)). 
3.4 Estimation results 
In this section, we present our estimation results. While Section 3.4.1 presents and discusses 
the results for our baseline model, Section 3.4.2 continues with a discussion of the estimation 
results for the extended version of the model. Section 3.4.3 closes the section by reporting the 
results of several robustness checks. 
3.4.1 Baseline model: General determinants of entry   
In a first step, we apply a semi-parametric survival model with the regression results being 
shown in Table 4. In interpreting the reported coefficients, it is important to note that the 
probability of entering a market is -1. Accordingly, coefficients below 1 indicate a lower 
probability to enter and values above 1 imply a higher probability compared to the 
counterfactual.  
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Table 4: Estimation results for baseline model (semi-parametric) 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) 
 Entry FlixBus Entry 
MeinFernbus 
Entry FlixBus Entry 
MeinFernbus 
Competitor presence variables     
Any competitor present 0.9302 0.7478
***   
 (0.0630) (0.0554)   
     
Any present =1 # Small market   0.1907*** 0.0801*** 
   (0.0733) (0.0403) 
     
Any present =1 # Medium market   0.7485** 0.6359*** 
   (0.0847) (0.0856) 
     
Any present =1 # Large market   1.1747** 1.0173 
   (0.0930) (0.0878) 
     
Spatial structure variables     
Centrality in Germany 1.0021
*** 1.0011*** 1.0021*** 1.0010*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
     
Max. motorway distance 0.9629*** 0.9953* 0.9623*** 0.9958 
 (0.0051) (0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0026) 
     
Distance 1.0004* 1.0002 1.0004* 1.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
     
Demographic variables     
     
Market size (ln) 1.3936*** 1.2116*** 1.2904*** 1.1673*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0297) (0.0489) (0.0289) 
     
Max. share under 24 1.1262*** 1.0746*** 1.1220*** 1.0841*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0196) (0.0280) (0.0197) 
     
Max. higher education 1.0032 1.0170*** 1.0040 1.0179*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0037) 
     
Max. tourism 0.7244*** 1.1720*** 0.7372*** 1.1789*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0348) (0.0321) (0.0351) 
     
Mode characteristics variables     
Airport shuttle 0.7872
** 0.2129*** 0.7786** 0.2089*** 
 (0.0936) (0.0384) (0.0925) (0.0377) 
     
Changes (train) 0.5966*** 0.7255*** 0.6020*** 0.7382*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0228) (0.0260) (0.0233) 
     
LR 2 1263.39 729.72 1304.77 788.67 
p>2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
# subjects 4,159 4,159 4,159 4,159 
# of failures 1,110 1,526 1,110 1,526 
# observations 89,835 81,737 89,835 81,737 
Exponentiated coefficients Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at route-level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Starting with a high-level perspective, our estimation results generally suggest very similar 
entry strategies for FB and MFB. In fact, Table 4 reveals that there is only one variable (Max. 
tourism) where the estimation results for the two main providers show opposite directions 
(with MFB having an increased interest in entering these routes while FB avoids them). 
Although the sizes (and partly also the significance levels) of all other coefficients partly 
diverge – suggesting different intensities of the desire to enter/not to enter routes with the 
respective characteristics – they all point into the same direction.  
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 Focusing on the regression results in columns (1a) and (1b), we further find that, on the 
one hand, four variables have a significantly negative effect on the probability to enter: the 
presence of a competitor in small and medium markets, maximum motorway distance (only 
FB significant), services to an airport and services into/from cities with a low quality rail 
connection. On the other hand, six variables show a clear positive effect on the probability to 
enter: the presence of a competitor in a large market (only FB significant), an increasing 
centrality of the route within Germany, the length of the route (only FB significant) and the 
three demographic variables market size, max. share under 24 and max. higher education 
(only MFB significant).  
 Starting a more detailed assessment of our estimation results with the competitor presence 
variables, columns (1a) and (1b) in Table 4 reveal that the probability of entering a route is 
generally decreasing with any other provider being active in the market already. Interestingly, 
the effect is found to be significant for MFB – the respective probability decreases by about 
25 percent (1-0.7478=0.2522) – however, does not affect FB’s entry probability significantly. 
However, if we interact the information on whether any competitor is active in the market 
already with terciles of market size – as shown in columns (1c) and (1d) in Table 4 – the 
identified effects differ substantially (particularly for FB). Both main competitors’ probability 
to enter a small market is reduced by about 81 percent (FB) and 92 percent (MFB), 
respectively. While for medium markets, this general effect is still found to a lesser degree (25 
percent for FB and 36 percent for MFB), the probability of entry switches to a positive impact 
(FB) or no impact (MFB) on the probability to enter for large markets.   
 The spatial structure variables all show the expected directions, however, partly differ 
between both main providers. While both FB and MFB show a (slightly but highly 
significant) increased probability to enter routes more centrally located in Germany, FB 
shows a decreasing interest in entering routes the farther they are away from the next 
motorway. Furthermore, while the probability to enter a route increases with its distance in 
the case of FB, MFB’s entry probability remains unaffected. 
 Turning to the demographic variables, we first find that the probability to enter a route 
increases substantially with growing market size showing an increase of 29 percent for FB 
and 17 percent for MFB. Second, our results also reveal that the probability increases 
substantially for both main providers with an increase in the maximum share of under 24 year 
olds living in either the origin or destination city. However, third, the broader variable of 
maximum share of higher education only shows a significant (but rather small) coefficient for 
MFB. Fourth, with respect to the impact of tourism on the probability to enter, we find the 
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diametrically opposing results already discussed above: while FB avoids entering touristic 
markets, MFB shows a substantially increased probability to enter those markets.  
 Last but not least, the mode characteristics variables both show identical directions of the 
coefficients, however, partly substantial differences with respect to their size. While both 
main competitors have a reduced probability to serve a route with an airport as either origin or 
destination, the effect is substantially larger for MFB (an about 79 percent reduced 
probability) compared to FB (showing a reduction in the probability of only about 22 
percent). With respect to entry into routes with a low quality rail connection, both main 
providers show a reduced probability in entering those routes (about 40 percent for FB and 
about 26 percent for MFB). 
 In addition to estimating the determinants of entry for the two market leaders – 
MeinFernbus and FlixBus – we also ran the respective regressions for the two runner-up 
providers BLB and ADAC Postbus. We find that both companies avoid entering all existing 
markets already populated by either MFB or FB – however, smaller and medium-sized 
markets with higher probabilities than large markets. Furthermore, on the one hand, BLB 
shows an increased interest in entering touristic markets and a reduced interest to enter routes 
with larger maximum shares of young inhabitants. ADAC Postbus, on the other hand, is 
found to have no particular interest in touristic markets, however, serves routes to/from an 
airport with a higher probability.16  
3.4.2 Model extension: Differentiating between different types of competitors  
In this section, we report the estimation results of our model extension. Starting from the 
baseline model, we particularly redefine our competitor presence variable in the following. 
Although our analysis – summarized in Table 4 above – provided useful first insights into 
competitive interaction in the industry, the highly aggregated category of ‘any competitor 
present’ is likely to hide important variation in the competitive interaction between MB and 
MFB, but also with respect to the runner-up providers BerlinLinienBus and ADAC Postbus.   
 In order to closer investigate these important aspects of competitive interaction, in a first 
step, we run a specification of the baseline model in which we only differentiate between MB, 
FB and all other providers. In a second step, we further split up the category of all other 
providers into BerlinLinienBus as incumbent and ADAC Postbus as larger additional 
competitor with a nation-wide network. The remaining ‘other’ and ‘regional’ providers 
remain in the ‘others present’ category. The respective estimation results are shown in Table 5 
                                                     
16  The underlying regression tables are available from the authors upon request.  
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below. Please note that – although all control variables discussed above are included – we 
refrain from reporting them.    
Table 5: Estimation results for model extension (semi-parametric) 
 (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
 Entry FlixBus Entry 
MeinFernbus 
Entry FlixBus Entry 
MeinFernbus 
FB # Small Market   0.4988  0.4643 
  (0.2507)  (0.2334) 
     
FB # Medium Market  0.8537  0.7961 
  (0.1277)  (0.1196) 
     
FB # Large Market  1.5109***  1.4086*** 
  (0.1468)  (0.1418) 
     
MFB # Small Market 0.1373***  0.1202***  
 (0.0693)  (0.0607)  
     
MFB # Medium Market 0.7619**  0.7125***  
 (0.0939)  (0.0885)  
     
MFB # Large Market 1.1525*  1.1334  
 (0.0989)  (0.0975)  
     
Others present  1.3735*** 0.5757*** 1.2888*** 0.5360*** 
 (0.1327) (0.0601) (0.1263) (0.0567) 
     
ADAC # Small Market   0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     
ADAC # Medium Market   0.1336*** 0.5301 
   (0.0775) (0.2193) 
     
ADAC # Large Market   0.9865 1.2964* 
   (0.1287) (0.1985) 
     
BLB # Small Market   0.3001*** 0.2038*** 
   (0.0943) (0.0498) 
     
BLB # Medium Market    0.7750 0.6101*** 
   (0.1318) (0.1048) 
     
BLB # Large Market   1.2386* 0.7845** 
   (0.1427) (0.0890) 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
LR 2 1313.14 761.42 1363.57 846.76 
p>2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
# subjects 4,159 4,159 4,159 4,159 
# of failures 1,110 1,526 1,110 1,526 
# Obs. 89,835 81,737 89,835 81,737 
Exponentiated coefficients Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at route-level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Technically, considering the high values for 2, all eight models presented in Tables 4 and 5 
show a very good fit. We further assess the goodness of fit based on Cox-Snell residuals (see 
Cox and Snell, 1968)17. The graphical representation is provided in Figure 4 in the Annex. 
                                                     
17  For models which fit the data well, the Cox-Snell residuals ought to have a standard exponential distribution 
with a hazard function of one for all t. Accordingly, the cumulative hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals should 
result in a 45 degree line. Usually, the cumulative hazard function of the Cox-Snell residuals is estimated 
with the Nelson-Aalen estimator. 
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 Starting our discussion of the main results with the specifications in columns (2a) and (2b), 
we see our findings of the baseline model confirmed for FB in both direction and size of the 
respective coefficients. The provider avoided MFB in small and medium markets and has an 
increased probability to enter large markets in which MFB already operated. In that respect, 
we can conclude that FB treats MFB no different from any other competitor.  
 For MFB, however, our estimation results suggest partly diverging results when comparing 
baseline results with the results of the model extension. While in small and medium markets, 
the probability of entering a particular route is not affected significantly by the presence of 
FB, in large markets, we now find, ceteris paribus, a large and highly significant increase in 
the probability of entry for routes in which FB already operates. This finding allows the 
conclusion that, for MFB, FB is not an ordinary ‘faceless’ competitor but a ‘special’ 
competitor in the sense that MFB’s entry behavior deviates substantially from the typical 
behavior identified in the baseline specification. 
 In columns (2c) and (2d), the perspective on competitive interaction in the industry is 
broadened further by decomposing the still highly aggregated group of providers other than 
FB and MFB used in specifications (1) and (2). As shown in Table 5, we now additionally 
differentiate between entries in route markets with a prior presence of the incumbent 
BerlinLinienBus as third largest provider and the (eventually fourth largest) new entrant 
ADAC Postbus.  
 While the results for FB and MFB largely remain unchanged – with the only exception of 
the ‘FB entry into large MFB markets’ coefficient turning insignificant – the coefficients for 
BLB and ADAC reveal additional interesting insights. While ADAC is largely treated no 
differently than other competitors – with the only exception of FB avoiding entry into 
medium markets already operated by ADAC – the results for BLB look partly different. 
While both FB and MFB show a significantly reduced probability to enter BLB markets in 
small and – in the case of MFB – also medium markets, the respective large market BLB 
coefficients show opposing results. While FB shows an about 24 percent increased probability 
to enter large markets in which BLB is already present, MFB shows an about 25 percent 
reduced probability to enter such markets. In other words, while FB applies an aggressive 
entry strategy towards BLB, MFB tries to avoid a direct confrontation with BLB.    
3.4.3 Robustness checks   
The presentation and discussion of our estimation results so far was based on the application 
of semi-parametric survival models. However, as already discussed in Section 3.2 above, 
survival models can also be estimated fully parametrically (with good reasons to apply one or 
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the other). Furthermore, despite its inability to take adequate account of the timing of entry 
decisions, our data structure and the empirical strategy as such also allows an application of 
probit models. In this section, we therefore briefly discuss the results of applying, first, a fully 
parametric survival model and, second, a probit model to our baseline model plus extension.   
 In applying a fully parametric survival model, we first have to identify the most 
appropriate distribution. As shown in Table 6 in the Annex, the Weibull distribution as well as 
the Log Logistic distribution fit best for both providers. The fully parametric estimation 
results are shown in Table 7 in the Annex. Although significance levels partly differ, the 
qualitative findings are in line with the results of the semi-parametric model discussed 
above.18  
 Technically, applying a fully parametric model allows us to predict durations needed for a 
provider to populate the entire market given the other provider is present or absent. Using the 
Weibull distribution, we find a prediction of 40 months for MFB if FB is not present and 55 
months if FB is present. Accordingly, in the absence of FB, MFB would need another 16 
months after our observation period to offer a service on each route in our sample. This 
timeframe increases to 31 months if FB would be present in each market. For FB, we find a 
slower entry activity reflected in a prediction of 53 months to populate all routes if MFB is 
not present and 85 months if MFB is present. In other words, if MFB was not present, FB 
would need another 29 months to populate the entire market and even 61 additional months if 
MFB was present.  
 Turning from the fully parametric survival model to an application of a probit model, we 
provide the respective estimation results in Table 8 in the Annex. The results reported in 
columns 1 and 2 are derived with exactly the same specification as used in our survival 
analysis and show a few differences with respect to significance levels but only one difference 
with respect to direction: the respective coefficient for FB entry into medium markets of MFB 
is found to be positive (yet insignificant).    
 In columns (3) and (4) in Table 8, we have added the further control variable ‘number of 
large cities still available’19 – for which survival models implicitly control for – to the probit 
model. Interestingly, the inclusion of this further variable changes the direction of the only 
qualitatively different coefficient in the original probit specification – reported in columns (1) 
and (2) – now leading to results perfectly in line with the semi-parametric estimation results. 
                                                     
18  In column 1 and 2, this result can be identified immediately, in case of the log logistic distribution, it is 
necessary to calculate 1 െ ߚ to receive the usual interpretable coefficients. Doing so in our case leads to 
negative coefficients for small and medium markets and a positive coefficient for large markets. 
19  The inclusion of the variable is equivalent to adding a non-linear time trend. 
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The identified inconsistency of our survival specification – when applied to a probit model – 
can be attributed to the right-censoring of the data – which is not captured by this kind of 
model – however, in our case, was resolved by the inclusion of an additional variable that 
controls for the number of large cities still available.  
3.5 Implications for business strategy and public policy   
In this section, we make use of our econometric and descriptive results to discuss several key 
implications for business strategy and public policy. From a business strategy perspective, our 
econometric results suggest that both market leaders – MFB and FB – reached their respective 
positions by applying very similar entry strategies. They both show an increased probability 
to enter populous, centrally located routes with large shares of young inhabitants; however, 
they both avoid entries into routes including an airport or with low quality rail connection. 
Furthermore, both market leaders refrain from entering small and medium-sized routes in 
which another provider is already operating. In large markets, however, they both show an 
increased entry probability independent of the presence of a competitor. 
 In terms of network construction, our econometric results are consistent with a strategy of 
both competitors to serve the important ‘backbone’ markets between larger cities (i.e., facing 
competition), however, to differentiate themselves (i.e., avoiding competition) on routes 
between small- and medium-sized cities. This general strategy of substantial route entry into 
both existing and new markets also separates the two market leaders from other providers 
who mostly decided to concentrate on certain regions (such as, e.g., the incumbent 
BerlinLinienBus with its strong presence on routes to/from Berlin but weak presence 
anywhere else in the country) or have a focus on ‘backbone’ markets (such as, e.g., ADAC 
Postbus). However, as suggested by the increasing route overlap over time – particularly 
between the two market leaders but also in relation to other competitors – the number of 
attractive new locations became more and more limited making it unavoidable to reach further 
route growth by entering into already existing medium-sized or even small markets. These 
developments may also have played a role in generating the desire of both market leaders to 
join forces in the form of a merger (discussed further below).   
 Despite the high degree of similarity between the entry strategies of MeinFernbus and 
FlixBus, our empirical analysis also reveals several differences. In particular, our econometric 
analysis showed that MeinFernbus has an increased interest to enter touristic routes while FB 
avoids them. This empirical finding is fully in line with the web presences of MFB and FB – 
with particularly the former actively promoting interurban bus trips to a large selection of 
holiday regions in the North (sea) and South (mountains) of Germany. Furthermore, our 
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extension of the econometric model revealed that both market leaders partly differ in their 
entry behavior towards other (significant) competitors in particularly large markets: while 
MFB shows an increased probability to enter ADAC Postbus markets, FB concentrates its 
entry activities on large markets in which BerlinLinienBus is already operating.   
 Still aiming at investigating differences in the entry activity of both market leaders, our 
descriptive analysis of network construction over time also revealed mentionable differences. 
While MeinFernbus had a first mover advantage in the sense that the company entered the 
industry several months before FlixBus, the first few months in the deregulation era showed a 
rather comparable development of both firms in terms of the number of route entries. 
However, while FlixBus followed a rather sustainable entry strategy, i.e., the company 
constantly added a few routes in almost every month, MeinFernbus decided – in the spring 
and summer months of 2013 and 2014 – to massively extend its route network; however, put 
its entry activity on hold in the respective fall and winter months. In sum, measured in terms 
of number of served routes (in December 2014), MFB’s strategy has proven more effective 
than FB’s strategy. However, both companies were successful in making use of the entry 
opportunities in the early days of the deregulated industry to extend their route networks with 
a much higher pace than any of their remaining competitors.  
 In this context, the merger plans of both companies – announced in January 2015 and 
already realized through the integration of both route networks in fall 2015 – demand a more 
detailed treatment from both a business strategy and a public policy perspective. With respect 
to the former, our empirical results suggest that the two merging companies followed 
comparable entry strategies – suggesting that an integration of both networks is a rather easy 
exercise. However, as well known from the respective management literature, mergers 
contain many other integration challenges – particularly when it comes to firm culture. 
Although these aspects are outside the scope of this paper, it appears reasonable to assume 
that the young age of both industry and merging companies ease the necessary integration 
process.  
 Turning from business strategy to public policy implications of the merger, it can generally 
be said that mergers between close competitors raise the question after their competitive 
effects in general and their price effects in particular. Although the compulsory assessment of 
the potential price effects of the merger is outside the scope of this paper (see Dürr et al., 
2016, for a detailed investigation), our descriptive analysis revealed a substantial number of 
411 route overlaps between the merging parties in December 2014. Although on the surface, 
such a constellation would speak for market-power induced price increases on the respective 
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routes post-merger, the low market entry barriers in combination with the generally high price 
elasticity of demand speak against larger (permanent) increase in prices. Furthermore, the 
merger might allow customers to enjoy the benefits of demand- and/or supply-side 
efficiencies realized by, e.g., a better network connectivity or cost reductions passed-on in the 
form of price reductions.20  
  In terms of the broader implications of our empirical results for public policy, one key aim 
of the deregulation of the interurban bus industry was an increase in the mobility of citizens 
with lower income levels living in larger urban areas. In this respect, our descriptive results of 
substantial entry activities in the first two years – leading to a quick extension of the 
interurban bus network – provides strong evidence that this key aim of deregulation has 
already been reached. It therefore appears likely that the deregulation of the industry creates 
substantial and clearly positive welfare effects – also by imposing increasing pressures on 
intermodal competitors such as particularly railway services to operate more efficiently and to 
fight for particularly price sensitive customers (e.g., through a restructuring of price 
differentiation strategies).  
 In addition to an increase in the mobility options between larger urban areas, the 
deregulation of the interurban bus industry also raised expectations of an improved 
connectivity of particularly smaller cities with either no or low quality rail connections. In this 
respect, our econometric results suggests that (at least) the two market leaders clearly avoided 
entry into such markets. However, in putting this result into perspective, it is important to 
remind that our empirical analysis only covers the first two years of the deregulation era. In 
this early stage of the deregulated industry, it is perfectly rational from the provider’s 
perspective to enter the (presumably) more profitable and strategically more important larger 
markets first. As a consequence, future years might witness an increased entry activity also 
into smaller city markets, especially if the major providers consider implementing hub-and-
spoke network architectures. Furthermore, a significant number of smaller cities is – although 
not connected to the network of the two largest providers – nevertheless already been served 
by smaller regional interurban bus companies.  
 Lastly and more generally, it is worth mentioning further that certain economic 
characteristics of cities – such as the mere size of the population but also, e.g., the share of 
young inhabitants – determine their attractiveness to be included into a provider’s network 
(see Dürr and Hüschelrath, 2016, for a detailed assessment). In this respect, it appears 
                                                     
20  Interestingly, the merger was not investigated by the German Federal Cartel Office as the worldwide 
cumulative turnover threshold of EUR 500 million – set out in German merger control – was not reached by 
the two merging parties. 
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unrealistic to expect that the majority of all 2,060 German cities will be connected to the 
interurban bus network anytime soon. In case the government identifies a need to connect 
certain rural areas to the interurban bus network – including the possibility to replace 
expensive (and partly subsidized) rail services with (presumably cheaper) bus services – it 
will have to consider paying a sufficient amount of subsidies to motivate the most efficient 
interurban bus provider to offer the respective service.    
4 Conclusion  
In the first two years after its deregulation in January 2013, the German interurban bus 
industry experienced a substantial growth in the size of its network – reflected, for example, 
in an increase in the number of connected cities from 56 cities to 222 cities (see Dürr and 
Hüschelrath, 2016). On the route-level, deregulation-induced growth was even more 
pronounced showing an increase in the number of served routes from 151 routes in January 
2013 to 3,603 routes in December 2014. Although a larger number of new entrants 
contributed to this substantial overall growth, two providers – claiming roughly half of all 
5,560 entries into either existing or new routes – emerged as clear market leaders: 
MeinFernbus (MFB) and FlixBus (FB). 
 In this context, we have used a comprehensive route-level data set to investigate the 
determinants of route entry of the two market leaders in the first two years after deregulation. 
Applying survival models, we find that both companies show an increased probability to enter 
populous, centrally located routes with large shares of young inhabitants; however, they both 
avoid entries into routes including an airport or with low quality rail connection. Furthermore, 
both market leaders refrain from entering small and medium-sized routes in which another 
provider is already operating. In large markets, however, they both show an increased entry 
probability independent of the presence of a competitor.   
 Based on these key results of our empirical analysis – and our complementary discussion 
of important implications for business strategy and public policy in the preceding section – 
several avenues for future research suggest itself. From a business strategy perspective, it is 
important to note that we focused on the external attractiveness/possibilities as key driver of 
entry decisions. However, the existing business strategy literature also puts particular 
emphasis on the importance of internal capabilities in deciding on the most promising entry 
strategy. Future research could therefore complement our external approach with such an 
internal capabilities-oriented perspective. Additionally, taking account of the large literature 
on competitive rivalry and competitive dynamics, a more detailed investigation of particularly 
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the role of entry attacks and counterattacks by the main providers appears as a fruitful area of 
future research.  
 From a public policy perspective, our focus on the determinants of entry in a recently 
deregulated network industry immediately suggests a complementary investigation of the 
effects of entry as part of future research. Although such a perspective is likely to generate 
further interesting insights – particularly on the importance of entry for the overall 
contribution of the industry to economic welfare – it could explicitly include an ex-post 
assessment of the effects of the recent merger between MFB and FB. In this perspective, it 
would not only be interesting to identify possible short-term effects on prices but especially to 
study the long-term implications of the deal through its impact on competition and 
competitive interaction in the German interurban bus industry in the years to come.   
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Annex 
 
Table 6: Information criteria for parametric model extension  
    Exponential Log Logistic 
Log 
Normal Weibull Gamma Gompertz 
AIC FlixBus 4,992.33 4,492.11 4,605.16 4,494.50 4,495.16 4,545.24
MeinFernbus 7,332.47 7,059.12 7,067.81 7,132.22 7,065.58 7,249.22
    
BIC FlixBus 5,124.01 4,633.20 4,746.25 4,635.58 4,645.66 4,686.32
  MeinFernbus 7,462.83 7,198.79 7,207.48 7,271.89 7,214.56 7,388.89
 
Table 7: Estimation results for model extension (parametric) 
 Weibull Log logistic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Entry FlixBus Entry 
MeinFernbus 
Entry FlixBus Entry 
MeinFernbus 
     
FB # Small Market   0.3851*  2.0295** 
  (0.1890)  (0.6603) 
     
FB # Medium Market  0.6694***  1.2698* 
  (0.0979)  (0.1596) 
     
FB # Large Market  1.3203***  0.6623*** 
  (0.1197)  (0.0609) 
     
MFB # Small Market 0.1267***  2.5963***  
 (0.0641)  (0.5575)  
     
MFB # Medium Market 0.7180***  1.1918***  
 (0.0882)  (0.0721)  
     
MFB # Large Market 1.1048  0.9232*  
 (0.0917)  (0.0441)  
     
Others present 1.2804** 0.6444*** 0.8340*** 1.5304*** 
 (0.1303) (0.0644) (0.0462) (0.1164) 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
LR 2 930.19 761.19 628.83 704.39 
p>2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
# subjects 4,159 4,159 4,159 4,159 
# of failures 1,110 1,526 1,110 1,526 
# Obs. 89,835 81,737 89,835 81,737 
 Exponentiated coefficients Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at route-level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Estimation results for model extension (probit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Entry 
FlixBus 
Entry 
MeinFernbus 
Entry 
FlixBus 
Entry 
MeinFernbus 
     
Present FlixBus=1 # Small market  -0.2527  -0.3395* 
  (0.1844)  (0.1858) 
     
Present FlixBus=1 # Medium market  -0.0287  -0.1238** 
  (0.0592)  (0.0619) 
     
Present FlixBus=1 # Large market  0.2499***  0.1818*** 
  (0.0400)  (0.0423) 
     
Present MeinFernbus=1# Small market -0.5563***  -0.7551***  
 (0.1611)  (0.1642)  
     
Present MeinFernbus=1 # Medium market 0.0548  -0.1240**  
 (0.0468)  (0.0501)  
     
Present MeinFernbus=1 # Large market 0.2274***  0.0742**  
 (0.0330)  (0.0366)  
     
Others present 0.1675*** -0.1451*** 0.1176*** -0.1691*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0397) (0.0421) (0.0407) 
     
# Large cities still available   -0.0010*** -0.0003*** 
   (0.0001) (0.0000) 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -3.0387*** -3.3693*** -2.4297*** -3.2005*** 
 (0.2510) (0.1956) (0.2718) (0.2050) 
     
LR 2 1077.53 839.81 1045.66 816.42 
p>2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1017 0.0498 0.1300 0.0532 
# Obs. 91,777 84,077 91,777 84,077 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 4: Goodness of fit – Cox-Snell residual 
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